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Abstract
A growing body of work suggests that both depressed and non-depressed individuals display implicit positivity towards the
self. In the current study, we examined whether this positivity can be underpinned by two qualitatively distinct propositions
related to actual (‘I am good’) or ideal (‘I want to be good’) self-esteem. Dysphoric and non-dysphoric participants completed
a self-esteem Implicit Association Test (IAT) as well an Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP) targeting their actual
self-esteem and an IRAP targeting ideal self-esteem. Both groups demonstrated similar and positive IAT effects. A more
complex picture emerged with regard to the IRAP effects. Whereas non-dysphorics did not differ in their actual and ideal
self-esteem, their dysphoric counterparts demonstrated lower actual than ideal self-esteem. Our results suggest that closer
attention to the role of propositional processes in implicit measures may unlock novel insight into the relationship between
implicit self-esteem and depression.
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Introduction
Self-esteem has been extensively investigated by researchers
from a wide variety of theoretical persuasions and currently
represents a key explanatory construct in many areas of
psychological science, including health psychology [1], social
psychology [2,3] and clinical psychology [4]. Within the latter
domain, negative self-schemas are thought to bias information
processing in an automatic, repetitive and difficult to control
manner [5]. These negative cognitions about the self are also
argued to play a significant role in the maintenance and
recurrence of depressive episodes [6,7]. Interestingly, however,
much work on self-esteem and its relationship to depression has
employed self-report measures which are susceptible to a variety of
response biases such as social desirability and self-presentation.
Many cognitive models of depression also assume that self-related
schemata are not always consciously accessible and thus cannot
always be verbally reported upon [8,9]. Consequently, it is
questionable whether the use of self-report measures may provide
meaningful information about such schemata. To overcome these
limitations, a number of alternative procedures have recently
emerged that reduce the participant’s ability to control their
responses and operate in such a way that they do not depend on
introspective access to the psychological content of interest.
Whereas self-report measures of self-esteem can be classified as
explicit measures that capture non-automatic instances of self-
evaluation (e.g., self-evaluations that occur when participants have
ample time and resources to reflect or have the intention to
evaluate the self), implicit self-esteem measures can be thought of
as measures that register more spontaneous, automatic self-
evaluations (e.g., self-evaluations that occur quickly or when
participants do not have the intention to evaluate the self; see
[10]).
Interestingly, a growing literature suggests that although
depressed and non-depressed people differ with respect to their
explicit self-esteem they demonstrate surprisingly similar levels of
(positive) implicit self-esteem [11,12,13,14]. Consider, for example,
the work of De Raedt and colleagues [11] who compared implicit
self-esteem in a group of depressed participants relative to healthy
controls using three separate paradigms: the Implicit Association
Test (IAT), Name Letter Preference Task (NLPT), and the
Extrinsic Affective Simon Task (EAST). Across all three measures
evidence for similar levels of positive implicit self-esteem was
obtained for both groups. Some studies have even reported higher
levels of (positive) implicit self-esteem in formerly depressed
relative to never-depressed participants [15,16].
In an attempt to explain these surprising findings, De Raedt and
colleagues [11] argued that the IAT and other measures of implicit
self-esteem may have captured actual self-esteem in non-depressed
participants but ideal self-esteem in depressed participants.
Whereas actual self-esteem refers to feelings of self-worth or the
global evaluation of the current self [17], ideal self-esteem is
considered to be a global representation of the attributes a person
would like to possess (see [18]). Numerous studies have provided
compelling evidence for the role of discrepancies between ideal
and actual self in depressive disorders [19,20]. One way to
conceptualize actual and ideal self-esteem is in terms of the type of
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relation between the self and positive and negative valence. One
could argue that both actual and ideal self-esteem involve such a
relation but differ in the way that these concepts are related.
Whereas actual self-esteem refers to current beliefs about the self
(i.e., I am good/bad), ideal self-esteem would reflect beliefs about
the desired future self (i.e., I want to be good/bad). These beliefs
are propositional in nature because, unlike associations, they
contain information about how concepts are related (see [21], for
an excellent discussion of the core differences between propositions
and associations).
De Raedt and colleagues’ [11] hypothesis certainly seems
plausible given implicit measures are usually designed to assess
whether one set of concepts (e.g., ‘self’ and ‘other’) is somehow
related to a second set of concepts (e.g., ‘positive’ or ‘negative’)
without regard to the way in which those concepts are related. To
illustrate, consider a typical self-esteem IAT. During a first test
phase, participants categorize items related to the self (e.g., the first
name of the participant) and positive words (e.g., HAPPY) using
one response key and items related to someone else (e.g., the first
name of another participant) and negative words (e.g., INCOM-
PETENT) using another response key. During a second test phase,
response mappings are reversed so that self-related items and
negative words are assigned to the first key whereas other-related
items and positive words are assigned to the second key. The
difference in how well someone performs during the first relative to
the second phase is considered to provide an overall measure of
how readily this person associates the concept ‘‘self’’ with positive
or negative valence. However, an IAT effect does not reveal how a
person relates those concepts. For some individuals, the IAT score
might reflect the extent to which someone believes that he or she is
good (i.e., actual self-esteem) whereas for other individuals, the
same score might reflect that he or she wants to be good (i.e., ideal
self-esteem).
With this idea in mind, Remue and colleagues [22] set out to
distinguish actual and ideal implicit self-esteem using a relatively
new procedure known as the Implicit Relational Assessment
Procedure (IRAP; [23]). The IRAP stems from an intellectual
tradition known as Contextual Behavioral Science [24] and a
functional account of human language and cognition known as
Relational Frame Theory (RFT; [25]). Unlike many other implicit
measures, the IRAP was specifically designed to capture how
objects, stimuli and events are automatically related to one another
(i.e., what RFT researchers refer to as ‘brief and immediate
relational responses’; see [26,27]). If we assume that the ease with
which people automatically relate stimuli is mediated by propo-
sitional knowledge in memory (see [28] for an in-depth discussion),
it could be argued that performance on the IRAP provides an
implicit measure of propositional knowledge. In order to test this
assumption, Remue et al. exposed a group of dysphoric and non-
dysphoric participants to two separate IRAPs: one designed to
assess actual and another to assess ideal self-esteem. Consistent
with their predictions, two contrasting patterns of implicit self-
esteem emerged, with dysphoric participants showing evidence of
lower actual and higher ideal self-esteem relative to their non-
dysphoric counterparts who showed evidence of higher actual and
lower ideal self-esteem compared to the former group. These
results tentatively suggest that the implicit measures used by De
Raedt and colleagues [11] may have assessed ideal self-esteem in
the dysphoric group and actual self-esteem in the non-dysphoric
group.
The present study set out to extend the work of De Raedt and
colleagues [11] and Remue and colleagues [22] in several ways.
Within the context of self-esteem, we examined whether implicit
measures that are designed to capture associations may in fact
reflect the operation of qualitatively distinct sets of propositions.
Whereas De Raedt and colleagues only used an IAT and Remue
et al. only used IRAPs, we asked our participants to complete both
a self-esteem IAT and two separate IRAPs, one targeting actual (‘I
am’) and another targeting ideal self-evaluations (‘I want to be’).
Moreover, we pre-selected participants who reported either high
scores (i.e., dysphoric group) or low scores (i.e., non-dysphoric
group) on an index of depressive symptoms during an earlier
screening study. Based on the ideas of De Raedt and colleagues
[11], we expected contrasting patterns of implicit self-esteem as a
function of the task employed and group tested. Although we
expected dysphoric and non-dysphoric participants to produce
similar (positive) scores on the self-esteem IAT, we anticipated that
they would diverge in their respective IRAP performances, with
the former group showing stronger ideal relative to the actual
implicit self-esteem and the latter group showing stronger actual
relative to ideal self-esteem. Furthermore, based on the idea the
IAT might capture different aspects of self-esteem in dysphoric
than in non-dysphoric participants, we expected that the IAT
would correlate most strongly with the ideal self-esteem IRAP in
the dysphoric group but with the actual self-esteem IRAP in the
non-dysphoric group. In addition, we included a number of
questionnaires to investigate whether a discrepancy between actual
and ideal self-esteem would also emerge at the explicit level. Our
goal here was to explore how implicit and explicit self-esteem
interact within and between these two groups.
Finally, it is worth noting that the current study provided us
with an opportunity to address three methodological issues that
arose in our earlier work. First, Remue and colleagues [22]
employed a shortened version of the IRAP containing two (rather
than the standard of six) test blocks which may have adversely
affected the reliability of the observed effects (see [29]). In order to
circumvent this concern, and facilitate a direct comparison
between our results and those observed elsewhere in the literature,
the current study included a standard (six-block) version of the
IRAP. Second, while Remue and colleagues [22] required
participants to respond with both speed (2500 ms) and accuracy
(80%) during the IRAP, recent evidence suggests that introducing
even stricter mastery criteria could lead to more robust IRAP
scores [26]. Hence, we opted for a more stringent set of latency
criteria than before. Third and finally, although many of the
stimuli used in Remue and colleagues were related to self-esteem
several were more directly relevant to depression in general (e.g.,
‘‘Happy’’, ‘‘Sad’’). Unlike the IAT in which the definition of the
categories (e.g. ‘Me’’ and ‘Worth’) appears to be more important
than the individual stimuli used (e.g. ‘Peter’ and ‘Successful’) [30],
it is crucial that stimuli directly relevant to the domain of interest
be employed in the IRAP (see [31] for a discussion). Therefore in




Participants gave their written informed consent and received
either credit or J10 for their participation. The study was
approved by the ethics committee of Ghent University. The
investigation was conducted in full accordance with the principles
expressed in the Declaration of Helsinki.
Participants
Sixty-four students participated in the current study. Prior to the
study, they were screened for depressive symptomatology using
the BDI-II-NL [32]. These same participants completed the
Actual/Ideal Self-Esteem IRAP
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BDI-II-NL for a second time upon arriving at the laboratory for
the actual test session. Both BDI-II-NL (pretest and test) scores
correlated highly, and were based on the same high/low
classifications. Using the recommended cut-off score from the
BDI-II-NL manual, the final sample was divided into two groups:
a low BDI group (#13) consisting of 35 students (30 women and 5
men) ranging from 18 to 30 years (M = 21, SD = 2.84) and a high
BDI group ($14) consisting of 29 students (25 women and 4 men)
ranging from 18 and 25 years (M = 19.38, SD = 2.06). Assignment
to BDI groups was based on the BDI score during the second (test)
session. By design, the high BDI group had significantly higher
scores during test (M = 21.93, SD = 8.36) compared to the low
group (M = 4.8, SD = 3.72), t(62) = 10.91, p,.001. Note that, by
design, BDI scores during the test session were not normally
distributed (Shapiro-Wilk = .892; p,.001) due to the fact that we
invited participants with extremely high or low BDI scores during
initial screening. We therefore used BDI as a dichotomous rather
than continuous variable in our analyses (however, for a critical
discussion see [33]).
Measures
Beck depression inventory (BDI-II-NL). The BDI-II-NL,
a 21 item self-report inventory, was used to measure the severity of
depressive symptoms [34]. The Dutch translation of the BDI-II
has shown high internal consistency: Cronbach’s a of.92 for a
patient population and.88 for a healthy control group. Also, the
validity index satisfies general psychometric criteria [27].
Rosenberg self-esteem scale. (RSES, [35]; Dutch transla-
tion by [36]). This self-report scale measures global feelings of self-
worth or self-acceptance and is widely used because of its proven
validity and test-retest reliability. It consists of 10 items where
participants have to state whether they totally agree, agree,
disagree or totally disagree with the presented statement. The
overall score represents the degree of global self-esteem, with
higher scores indicating higher self-esteem.
Semantic differentials. Participants were presented with the
same twelve target stimuli as used in the IRAP and IAT (six
positive and six negative) and asked to evaluate each of them using
a five-point scale ranging from 0 (Totally Disagree) to 4 (Totally
Agree). Each word was rated twice, once with respect to actual
self-evaluations (e.g., ‘I am successful’) and once with respect to
ideal self-evaluations (‘I want to be successful’). In this way we
sought to acquire two broad measures of self-esteem, one related
to self-reported actual (SR Actual) and a second related to self-
reported ideal (SR Ideal) self-esteem. Finally, participants were
given a number of additional questionnaires related to their
psychological flexibility and rumination. However, all of these
served exploratory purposes and will not be discussed further.
IAT. During the IAT, the words ‘Me’ and ‘Not Me’ served as
the target category labels and the words ‘Worth’ and ‘Worthless’
served as the attribute category labels. Six positively valenced (the
Dutch words for confident, nice, successful, important, intelligent,
competent and pleasant) and six negatively valenced Dutch
adjectives (insecure, inferior, failure, worthless, useless and stupid)
served as attribute stimuli. The participant’s first name and
surname, place of residence and nationality were used as stimuli
for the target category ‘Me’. The first name and surname of
another participant were used as two items for the target category
‘Not me’ while a fabricated (non-Belgian) place of residence and
nationality were used as two additional items in that same
category.
Prior to the onset of the IAT, participants were informed that a
series of words would appear one-by-one in the middle of the
screen and that their task was to categorize those stimuli as quickly
and accurately as possible. They were also informed that the
category labels ‘Me’ and ‘Not Me’ as well as ‘Worth’ and
‘Worthless’ would appear on the upper left and right sides of the
screen and that stimuli presented in the middle of the screen
should be assigned to these categories by pressing either the E (left
response) or the I key (right response) on an AZERTY keyboard.
Each trial started with the presentation of a fixation cross for
200 ms in the middle of the screen followed immediately by a
target or attribute stimulus. If the participant categorized a word
correctly - by selecting the appropriate key for that block of trials -
the stimulus disappeared from the screen and the next trial began.
In contrast, an incorrect response resulted in the presentation of a
red ‘X’ which remained on-screen until the correct key was
pressed. Overall, each participant completed seven blocks of trials.
During the first block of 20 practice trials they were requires to sort
the self- or other-related words into their respective categories,
with ‘Me’ assigned to the left (‘E’) key and ‘Not Me’ with the right
(‘I’) key. On the second block of 20 practice trials participants had
to assign positively valenced stimuli to the ‘Worth’ category using
the left key and negative stimuli to the ‘Worthless’ category using
the right key. Blocks 3 (20 trials) and 4 (40 trials) involved a
combined assignment of target and attribute stimuli to their
respective categories. Specifically, participants categorized ‘Me’
and positive words using the left key and ‘Not Me’ and negative
words using the right key. The fifth block of 20 trials reversed the
key assignments for self- and other-related items, with ‘Me’ now
assigned to the right key and ‘Not Me’ with the left key. Finally,
the sixth block (20 trials) and seventh block (40 trials) required
participants to categorize ‘Me’ and negative words with the right
key and ‘Not Me’ and positive words with the left key. The order
of the critical test blocks was counterbalanced across participants.
IRAP. The IRAP is a computerized latency-based measure
which requires participants to respond quickly and accurately to
stimuli in ways that are deemed consistent or inconsistent with
their prior learning history. Specifically, half of the IRAP trials
require participants to respond in ways that are consistent with
their (assumed) history of learning, while the other half require
participants to respond in ways that are inconsistent with that
same history. For instance, participants might be asked to respond
‘‘True’’ to the statement ‘‘I want to be Good’’ on half of the trials
but to respond ‘‘False’’ on the other half. The difference in time
taken to respond on consistent relative to inconsistent trials -
defined as the IRAP effect - is assumed to provide an index of the
strength or probability of the targeted relations. Reliability
estimates differ substantially between studies, ranging from values
as low as.23 to values as high as.81 (for more on the measure and
its psychometric properties see [37,38]).
In the current study, each IRAP involved a minimum of two
and a maximum of six practice blocks followed by a fixed set of six
test blocks. Each block consisted of 24 trials that presented one of
two self-related label stimuli (e.g., ‘I Am’ or ‘I Am Not’) in the
presence of one of two types of target stimuli (positive or negative
words drawn from the same set as the IAT) and required
participants to emit one of two relational responses (‘True’ or
‘False’). In this way, the IRAP was comprised of four different
types of trials (or ‘‘trial-types’’: Self-Positive; Self-Not Positive,
Self-Negative and Self-Not Negative; see Figure 1). Trials were
presented in a quasi-random order so that each of the four trial-
types appeared six times within each block in a random order.
Prior to the IRAP participants were informed that they would
complete a word categorization procedure that required them to
follow a general rule for responding. Specifically, on one set of
Actual/Ideal Self-Esteem IRAP
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blocks they were presented with the message ‘‘Please respond AS
IF I am positive and I am not negative’’ (self-positive block), while
on the alternative set of blocks they were presented with the
message ‘‘Please respond AS IF I am negative and I am not
positive’’ (self-negative block). Stated more precisely, a correct
response during self-positive blocks required participants to select
‘True’ when ‘I Am’ appeared with a positive target stimulus (e.g.,
‘Intelligent’) or when ‘I Am Not’ appeared with a negative target
(e.g., ‘Stupid’). At the same time, participants were also required to
choose ‘False’ when ‘I Am’ appeared with a negative word or
when ‘I Am Not’ appeared with a positive target stimulus. The
opposite pattern of responding was required during self-negative
blocks. The general rule for responding was alternated across each
IRAP block to form three successive pairs of test blocks.
The IRAP commenced with a pair of practice blocks.
Participants progressed from the practice to the test blocks when
they met accuracy (at least 80% accuracy) and latency criteria
(median latency of less than 2000 ms) on a successive pair of
practice blocks. Failure to meet these criteria resulted in re-
exposure to another pair of practice blocks until participants either
achieved the mastery criteria or a maximum of three pairs of
practice block were completed. Failure to satisfy task requirements
following three pairs of practice blocks resulted in participants
being thanked, debriefed and dismissed (in the current study one
participant failed to complete both IRAPs, another three failed the
actual self IRAP while six more did not satisfy those same criteria
during the ideal self IRAP). When the above criteria were met, a
fixed set of three pairs of test blocks were then administered.
Finally, it is worth noting that the actual and ideal self IRAPs
differed only with respect to their self-related label stimuli. That is,
while the actual self IRAP required participants to respond to
valenced target stimuli using the terms ‘I Am’ or ‘I Am Not’ the
ideal self IRAP required participants respond to the same stimuli
in terms of ‘I Want To Be’ or ‘I Don’t Want To Be’.
Procedure
Upon arriving at the laboratory participants were welcomed by
the researcher, asked to read and sign statements of consent and
seated in front of a computer from which they received all
instructions. They were informed that they would complete a
number of questionnaires as well as computer based tasks - and
given the sensitive nature of the study - that they would be
randomly assigned an identification number in order to preserve
their confidentiality and anonymity. Thereafter, participants
completed the various self-report measures, an IAT and two
IRAPs. The order of questionnaires and implicit measures as well
as the order of the two IRAPs were counterbalanced across
participants. The IAT was always administered prior to the two
IRAPs. Overall, the experiment lasted about 60 minutes.
Figure 1. Examples of the four trial-types used in the actual self-esteem IRAP. On each trial, a label stimulus (e.g., ‘I am’ or ‘I am not’), a
target stimulus (e.g., ‘Successful’ or ‘Incompetent’) and two relational response options (True and False) were shown on the screen. Note: the ideal
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Results
Data Preparation
Counterbalancing the order of the two IRAPs as well as
evaluative measures (questionnaires and implicit measures) did not
produce any main or interaction effects. Consequently, data were
collapsed across both factors.
Implicit Measures
IAT. Following the recommendations of Greenwald and
colleagues [39], response latency data from the IAT was prepared
using the D1 scoring algorithm. This transformation resulted in
one IAT score for each participant, reflecting the difference in
mean response latency between consistent and inconsistent blocks
divided by the overall variation in those latencies. Scores were
calculated so that positive values reflected a relatively higher
positive self-esteem bias whereas negative values indicated the
opposite. When IAT scores from the dysphoric and non-dysphoric
groups were submitted to an independent samples t-test no
significant difference emerged, t(62) = .81, p = .42. Consistent with
our predictions, dysphoric (M = .59, SD = .47) and non-dysphoric
groups (M = .68, SD = .35) both demonstrated similar and robust
levels of positive implicit self-esteem.
IRAP. Response latency data were transformed into D-IRAP
scores using an adaptation of Greenwald et al. ’s [39] D algorithm
(for details of this data transformation see [26]). For each IRAP,
we calculated a single overall D-IRAP score - one for the actual
self IRAP and a second for the ideal self IRAP. These values were
calculated so that higher scores reflected higher levels of (actual or
ideal) self-esteem. When submitted to a 2 (BDI Group) x 2 (IRAP-
Type; Actual vs. Ideal) mixed-models ANOVA, a main effect for
IRAP-Type, F(1, 52) = 14.72, p,.001, g2partial = .22, as well as a
two-way interaction between IRAP-Type and BDI Group was
obtained, F(1, 52) = 5.29, p = .03, g2partial = .09. This crucial
interaction effect reveals a stronger discrepancy between actual
and ideal self-esteem IRAP scores in dysphoric participants
(M = .21, SD = .29) than in non-dysphoric participants (M = .05,
SD = .19),
To explore this interaction, we compared BDI groups for each
IRAP separately as well as both IRAPs for each group separately.
The first set of analyses did not reveal differences between the
dysphoric and non-dysphoric groups in terms of their respective
IRAP performances (all ps..2). The second set of analysis did not
reveal a difference between scores on the actual (M = .11,
SD = .27) and ideal (M = .16, SD = .24) IRAPs for non-dysphorics
(p..2) but did reveal more positive scores on the ideal self
(M = .23, SD = .24) relative to the actual self IRAP (M = .02,
SD = .22) for dysphoric participants, t(25) = 3.6, p = .001, d = .93
(see Figure 2). To assess the internal consistency of the IRAP, two
split-half reliability scores were calculated, one for the actual self
IRAP and one for the ideal self IRAP. In each case, two scores
were calculated, one for odd trials and the second for even trials,
and these were obtained in the same way as for the overall D-
IRAP score, except that the D-algorithm was applied separately to
all odd trials and even trials. The split-half correlations between
odd and even scores, applying Spearman-Brown corrections, for
the Actual-Self IRAP was (r = .53) and Ideal-Self IRAP was
(r = .45). These split-half reliabilities were based on all participants
who completed both IRAPs. The IAT’s internal consistency
(r = .96) was based on a Spearman-Brown corrected split-half
correlation, the split-halves being derived from alternating pairs of
trials in both critical blocks
Explicit Measures
Consistent with our predictions, we found that dysphoric
participants (M = 13.0, SD = 3.0) showed significantly lower self-
esteem scores on the Rosenberg scale relative to their non-
dysphoric counterparts (M = 20.6, SD = 3.5), t(62) = 9.11, p,.001,
d = 2.29. When actual and ideal-self evaluations were submitted to
a 2 (Self: Actual vs. Ideal) x 2 (BDI Group) mixed models
ANOVA, a main effect for BDI Group, F(1, 62) = 48.13, p,.001,
g2partial = .44, and a two-way interaction between Self and BDI
Group was obtained, F(1, 62) = 50.99, p,.001, g2partial = .45. This
reveals that dysphoric participants showed significantly higher self-
discrepancy scores (M = 19.83, SD = 6.60) than their non-dys-
phoric counterparts (M = 9.91, SD = 4.45). To explore this
interaction, we compared BDI groups for each self-evaluation
separately as well as both self-evaluations for each group
separately. The first set of analyses revealed that non-dysphoric
participants (M = 35.14, SD = 4.72) reported significantly higher
actual self-evaluations than their dysphoric counterparts
(M = 24.24, SD = 6.03), t(62) = 8.11, p,.001. Dysphoric
(M = 44.07, SD = .34) and non-dysphoric individuals (M = 45.06,
SD = 2.89) showed similar and high levels of ideal-self evaluations
(p = .22). The second set of analysis revealed a significant
difference between actual and ideal self-evaluations for both
dysphoric, t(28) = 16.18, p = .001, and non-dysphoric participants,
t(35) = 13.17, p = .001.
Correlations
Implicit-explicit correlations. In the non-dysphoric group,
the IAT and ideal self-evaluations (SR Ideal) correlated positively,
r = 0.43, n = 35, p = .009, while a marginally significant positive
correlation appeared between the IAT and actual self-evaluations
(SR Actual), r = 0.30, n = 35, p = .077. However, no significant
correlations emerged between the actual and ideal IRAPs and any
of the explicit measures. With respect to the dysphoric group, no
significant correlations emerged between the IAT and the various
explicit measures. However, the actual (but not the ideal self
IRAP) correlated positively with self-esteem (RSES), r = 0.42,
n = 28, p = .027, and actual self-evaluations (SR Actual), r = 0.53,
n = 28, p = .004.
Implicit-Implicit correlations. A series of correlations
within dysphoric and non-dysphoric participants were used to
determine whether IAT and IRAP effects were related but none of
the tests proved significant (see Tables 1 and 2): IAT with actual
self IRAP (all ps..3); IAT with ideal self IRAP, (all ps..6). A
significant correlation did emerge between the actual and ideal self
IRAPs for the non-dysphoric, r = .70, n = 28, p,.001, but not the
dysphoric group (p = .51). Although participants were pre-selected
because they had high or low scores on the BDI during a screening
study, a number of individuals nevertheless revealed BDI scores
around the cut-off point during the actual test session. When a
more stringent cut-off value was employed to create the non-
dysphoric (scores from 0–9) and dysphoric groups (scores from 16–
64) an almost identical set of findings emerged.
Explicits. In the non-dysphoric group, we found a significant
positive correlation between self-esteem (RSES) and actual (SR
Actual), r = 0.56, n = 35, p = .001. Finally, actual (SR Actual) and
ideal (SR Ideal) self-esteem correlated positively, r = 0.40, n = 35,
p = .019. With respect to the dysphoric group, self-esteem (RSES)
and actual self-evaluations (SR Actual) correlated positively,
r = 0.71, n = 29, p,.001 (see Tables 1 and 2).
Actual/Ideal Self-Esteem IRAP
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Discussion
Accumulating evidence suggests that although depressed and
non-depressed people differ with respect to their explicit self-
esteem they demonstrate surprisingly similar levels of (positive)
implicit self-esteem. In an attempt to explain these surprising
findings, it has been argued that the IAT and other implicit
measures capture actual self-esteem in non-depressed participants
but ideal self-esteem in depressed participants [11,22]. In the
current study we put this assumption to the test. In particular, we
examined whether implicit measures designed to capture associ-
ations between the self and valenced stimuli (IAT) actually reflect
the operation of qualitatively distinct sets of self-related proposi-
tions (IRAP). Whereas De Raedt and colleagues [11] only used an
IAT and Remue et al. [22] only used IRAPs, we asked participants
to complete both a self-esteem IAT and two separate IRAPs, one
targeting actual (‘I am’) and another targeting ideal self-evaluations
(‘I want to be’). Based on previous work, we expected to observe
Figure 2. Mean D-IRAP scores as a function of IRAP-Type (actual vs. ideal) and BDI group (high vs. low). A positive value indicates a pro
self-esteem bias and a negative score indicates the opposite.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0108837.g002
Table 1. Correlation matrix of explicit and implicit self-esteem scores for the low BDI group.
IAT Actual IRAP Ideal IRAP RSES SR Actual SR Ideal
IAT
Actual IRAP .20
Ideal IRAP .10 .70**
RSES 2.03 2.23 .05
SR Actual .30 .04 .05 .55**
SR Ideal .43* .17 .20 .01 .40*
Note: RSES = Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale; SE Actual = Self-reported actual self-esteem; SR Ideal = Self-reported ideal self-esteem. * = p,.05 ** = p,.001.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0108837.t001
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three outcomes. First, dysphoric and non-dysphoric participants
should produce similar (positive) scores on the self-esteem IAT.
Second, those same participants should diverge in their respective
IRAP performances, with dysphorics showing stronger ideal
relative to the actual self-esteem and non-dysphorics stronger
actual relative to ideal self-esteem. Third, performance on the
actual-self IRAP (in the non-dysphoric group) and performance on
the ideal-self IRAP (in the dysphoric group) should differentially
correlate with the IAT.
Consistent with our first prediction, we found that dysphoric
and non-dysphoric participants were relatively quicker to catego-
rize self-related words with positive compared to negative stimuli
on the IAT. This finding is also consistent with work elsewhere in
the literature on the near universal positivity towards the self [14]
that seems to emerge regardless of current or former depressive
symptomatology [15,16]. At the same time, our results extend
beyond this early work. As indicated by the significant interaction
between IRAP type and group, dysphoric participants showed a
greater discrepancy between their (implicit) actual and ideal self-
esteem than their non-dysphoric counterparts. This result repli-
cates the crucial finding of Remue and colleagues [22]. However,
several caveats should be noted. First, although the interaction
between IRAP type and group was significant, several of the
simple main effects involved in this interaction did not reach
conventional levels of significance. Whereas dysphorics did show
higher scores on the ideal self-esteem IRAP than on the actual self-
esteem IRAP, non-dysphorics did not score differently on the two
IRAPs. Hence, we did not replicate the finding of Remue et al.
that non-dysphorics have a higher score on the actual self-esteem
IRAP than on the ideal self-esteem IRAP. Unlike Remue et al., we
also did not observe significant differences between groups in their
performance on each of the IRAPs. Finally, and contrary to our
third prediction, we did not observe a contrasting pattern of
correlations between the IAT and IRAP as a function of depressive
symptomatology.
Although our main goal was to investigate differences between
different types of implicit self-esteem, we also included a number of
questionnaires in order to investigate explicit self-esteem, and its
relationship with implicit self-esteem. We found that dysphoric
participants produced significantly lower scores on the Rosenberg
scale relative to non-dysphoric participants. However, when actual
and ideal-self evaluations were compared, a more complex picture
emerged. Both groups displayed higher levels of ideal relative to
actual-self evaluations, with the dysphoric group producing
significantly lower actual-self scores than their non-dysphoric
peers. Following the discrepancy theory of Higgins [18] which
states that the discrepancy between the actual and ideal self is a
cognitive risk factor for depression, and consistent with previous
work in this area (e.g., [40]), individuals suffering from higher
levels of self-reported depressive symptomatology displayed greater
discrepancies between their ideal and actual self-evaluations than
those who did not report such symptoms. Note that discrepancy
theory is supported not only by the effects that we observed on the
explicit measures but also by the differences between groups in
actual-ideal self-esteem discrepancy on the implicit measures.
We also found that implicit and explicit self-esteem correlated
with one another in different ways as a function of depressive
symptomatology. For instance, actual and ideal-self evaluations in
the non-dysphoric condition tended to correlate regardless of the
measure used. That is, explicit measures of ‘actual’ self-esteem
correlated with explicit ‘ideal’ self-esteem while both explicit
measures correlated with performance on the IAT in the non-
dysphoric group. However, no correlations emerged between
actual and ideal self-evaluations on either the explicit or implicit
measures for participants in the dysphoric group.
Based on the above, an important next step is to develop a more
sophisticated understanding of how self-related cognitions impact
implicit and explicit self-esteem. In conducting this work several
points are worth noting. First, the research presented here (as well
as in Remue et al. [22]) utilized a normative sample of students
that varied in their respective levels of self-reported depressive
symptomatology. It remains to be seen whether a sample of
clinically depressed, remitted or recovered participants would also
show evidence of elevated ideal and diminished actual self-
evaluations. Second, it may be that other implicit propositions
such as those related to people’s personal expectations (e.g., ‘I
should be’ or ‘I need to be’), how they compare themselves to others
(e.g., ‘I am good but others are better’) or perceived failures (e.g.,
‘I’m not good enough’) are even more important for predicting
behavior. With this in mind, research could examine whether
IRAPs targeting other types of propositional knowledge provide
even better diagnostic and predictive information about clinical
and non-clinical populations. Third, while the current study
assessed propositions related to actual and ideal self-esteem
separately via two IRAPs, it may be that juxtaposing one set of
propositions (e.g., ‘I am good’) with another (e.g., ‘I need to be
better’) within a single IRAP would enable us to determine how the
assessment context influences the activation of different proposi-
tions and their respective influence on one another. It may be that
activating two sets of propositions within rather than across
measurement contexts could magnify discrepancies between actual
and ideal self-evaluations.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to test the idea
that a single IAT might actually reflect different implicit beliefs in
different people. More specifically, the fact that dysphoric and
non-dysphoric individuals reveal similarly high scores on IAT it
might be due to the fact that the IAT reflects (high) ideal self-
esteem in dysphorics and (high) actual-self esteem in non-
Table 2. Correlation matrix of explicit and implicit self-esteem scores for the high BDI group.
IAT Actual IRAP Ideal IRAP RSES SR Actual SR Ideal
IAT
Actual IRAP .02
Ideal IRAP .03 .13
RSES .28 .42* 2.01
SR Actual .20 .53* 2.06 .71**
SR Ideal .09 2.31 .06 .00 .11
Note: RSES = Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale; SE Actual = Self-reported actual self-esteem; SR Ideal = Self-reported ideal self-esteem. * = p,.05 ** = p,.001.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0108837.t002
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dysphorics. Based on this idea, we predicted that IAT scores
should correlate primarily with ideal self-esteem IRAP scores in
dysphorics but with actual self-esteem IRAP scores in non-
dysphorics. Our data do not, however, reveal such pattern of
correlations. Although these null findings might indicate that the
IAT does not capture different beliefs in different groups, it is also
possible other factors came into play. First, IRAPs scores were
somewhat unreliable which reduces changes of finding meaningful
correlations. Second, counterbalancing of the order of the three
tasks and administrating those three task within a single session
could have increased error variance.
Finally, in replicating the work of Remue and colleagues [22],
we implemented a number of methodological refinements that
sought to strengthen the arguments forwarded in that earlier paper
(e.g., we used a traditional six-block variant of the IRAP, more
stringent mastery criteria and stimulus selection). In their paper, a
number of dysphoric and non-dysphoric participants (22%) failed
to complete an IRAP and they may have done so for entirely
different reasons, with the former failing due to a lack of
motivation and the latter due to an inability to respond quickly
and accurately to certain propositions (or even vice-versa). The
modifications implemented in the current study appear to be
successful insofar attrition rates (14%) were lower than those
reported by Remue et al. and other studies elsewhere in the IRAP
literature (see [29]). In addition, the split-half reliability estimates
obtained in the current study proved to be relatively higher then to
those seen in Remue et al. and elsewhere in the literature.
Although we did observe a significant interaction between
group and IRAP type, other effects failed to reach significance
(e.g., lack of group difference on the IAT and the two IRAPs). In
part, these null effects could be due to a lack of power because of
the relatively small sample. We therefore recommend that
replications of our findings - especially those comparing clinical
and healthy populations - incorporate power analyses to ensure
that an adequate sample size is employed so that statistically
reliable inferences can be drawn. The lack of power could also
explain why we failed to replicate the observation of Remue et al.
that non-dysphorics score higher on the actual self-esteem IRAP
than on the ideal self-esteem IRAP, as well as the observation that
both groups differed in their performance on each of the IRAPs.
Nevertheless, future work could explore whether differences in the
number of IRAP blocks, stimuli employed, mastery criteria used or
other procedural properties contribute to the inconsistencies
observed between the results of our study and the results of
Remue et al. For instance, we always exposed participants to an
IAT before the two IRAPs, which may have influenced the
expression of self-related evaluations on the IRAP. Future work
could counterbalance these measures to assess potential carry-over
effects between measures.
Conclusion
To summarize, our results indicate that dysphoric and non-
dysphoric individuals experience implicit positivity towards the
self. Most importantly, dysphoric participants revealed a stronger
discrepancy between actual and ideal self-esteem as indexed by
IRAPs compared to non-dysphoric participants. This finding not
only supports the theoretical position that the discrepancy between
actual and ideal self-esteem is related to dysphoria but also
demonstrates the added value of using implicit measures such as
the IRAP that can capture different implicit beliefs.
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